Hyperinflation Could Not Shift the “Date of Sale” in a Turkish Rebar Dumping Review

KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US

Authored by: Jeremy J. Gustrowsky

The Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade upholding the Commerce Department’s use of a Turkish steelmaker’s invoice date, rather than its contract date, when calculating antidumping duties. The outcome left Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S. with a final duty rate of 25.86 percent on its exports of steel concrete reinforcing bar (commonly called rebar) to the United States.

Some background helps explain why the date matters so much. Under the Tariff Act of 1930, Commerce may impose antidumping duties when foreign goods are sold in the United States for less than their “normal value,” meaning roughly the price of the same goods in the home market at a time that reasonably corresponds to the time of the U.S. sale. To pin down that moment, Commerce adopted a regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i), which says the agency will “normally” use the invoice date recorded in the seller’s ordinary business records, but may use a different date if that other date better reflects when the exporter or producer established the material terms of the sale. Commerce explained when it adopted the rule that price and quantity are often still being negotiated right up until the invoice issues.

Commerce imposed antidumping duties on Turkish rebar in 2017 and later conducted an administrative review covering July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022. During that period, Turkey experienced hyperinflation, with annualized inflation topping 25 percent for several months. Kaptan argued that Commerce should have used the contract date as the date of sale, because prices in Turkey shot up between the time it signed contracts with U.S. buyers and the time it invoiced the shipments. Kaptan pointed out that none of its contracts were actually changed during the review period, and that an internal board resolution barred anyone from altering agreed prices or quantities without board approval. Commerce was unconvinced and stuck with the invoice date.

On appeal, Kaptan first argued that the invoice-date rule exceeded Commerce’s statutory authority under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision ending automatic deference to agency readings of statutes. The Federal Circuit found that argument misplaced. Everyone in the case agreed on what “time of sale” means, namely the date the material terms of the transaction are established, and no one claimed the statute was ambiguous. With no disputed statutory term to interpret, there was nothing for Loper Bright to do. The court also declined to treat the regulation as creating a “presumption” in favor of the invoice date, describing it instead as a starting point for a fact-specific inquiry that imposes no extra burden on a respondent who has already produced documents and questionnaire responses. Kaptan’s counsel conceded at oral argument that, viewed as a starting point, the rule was within the agency’s authority. The court added that Congress gave Commerce broad authority to issue implementing regulations for the Tariff Act, and that Kaptan had forfeited any separate challenge to how Commerce read its own regulation by failing to brief the issue under Kisor v. Wilkie.

The second question was whether substantial evidence supported Commerce’s choice. It did. Kaptan’s own questionnaire responses stated that, for U.S. sales, the parties could amend the latest shipment date, the size breakdown (the specific price and quantity for each unique rebar product), and to a lesser extent the overall quantity until the goods were shipped or invoiced. Kaptan argued on appeal that those answers were inaccurate, but it never flagged any correction to Commerce during the review, so the agency was entitled to rely on what Kaptan actually said. Commerce also found the submitted contracts ambiguous, because Kaptan produced two versions of the same contract with inconsistent indications about whether the size breakdown was attached or would be supplied later. Taken together, that record reasonably showed the material terms were not locked in at the contract date.

The court rejected Kaptan’s remaining points in short order. The fact that the contracts were never actually amended did not matter, since the terms permitted amendment, and the internal board resolution did not outweigh the rest of the record. Even if the evidence could support Kaptan’s reading as well, that would not make Commerce’s contrary findings unreasonable. Finally, the court declined Kaptan’s invitation to fix what the company called an unfair result, roughly $20 million in extra duties for honoring contracts signed before hyperinflation drove up Turkish prices. Courts may not substitute their own policy preferences for an agency’s judgment when the agency’s decision rests on substantial evidence and is consistent with the law.

The practical lesson for exporters is a familiar one. Questionnaire responses and the contract documents placed on the record will drive the outcome, and a respondent hoping to displace the invoice date needs to say clearly, and early, that its material terms were fixed earlier and fully support that claim with consistent paperwork.